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I.

INTRODUCTION

Experts
in public infrastructure
financing
acknowledge the increasing use of impact fees to
economic burdens that new development can place
taxpayers One of the dominant reasons for the trend

universally
reduce the
on existing
is the "New

1. See Brian W. Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The 'Second
Generation,'38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMip. L. 55, 55 (1990); David L. Callies &
Malcolm Grant, Payingfor Growth and PlanningGain: An Anglo-American Comparisonof
Development Conditions, Impact Fees and Development Agreements, 23 URB. LAW. 221
(1991); Terry D. Morgan, Recent Developments in the Law of Impact Fees with Special
Attention to Legislation, 1990 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 4-1; James C.
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Federalism" and the resulting loss of federal revenue-sharing funds
2
formerly available to municipalities. As the use of impact fees has
increased, however, litigation over these fees has also increased.
This litigation typically has focused on whether municipalities
have legislative authority to impose impact fees and, if so, what
constitutional limitations govern that authority. Where legislative
authority is less than clear, there has been much discussion as to
whether legislation is needed and what provisions should be
included if legislation is to be adopted.
Minnesota has in many ways typified the debate over impact
fees, and its experience merits particular observation. In CountryJoe,
Inc. v. City of Eagan,3 the City of Eagan's use of a road unit
connection charge was challenged as an unauthorized impact fee.4
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court sidestepped the issue, it has
directed renewed attention to the use and legitimacy of impact fees
in Minnesota. Because impact fees are likely to ultimately be used in
Minnesota and because most states addressing these questions have
done so with a view to the courts and legislatures of other
jurisdictions, this article focuses on issues raised in state and federal
courts, the legislative enactments adopted by other states to deal with
impact fees, and how Minnesota can avoid the problems that have
surfaced elsewhere. 5
II.

IMPACT FEES DEFINED

Distinguishing impact fees from other types of developer
6
exactions is not a simple task. Many of the features of impact fees

Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, LAW &

CONTEMP.

PROBS., Winter 1987, at 85.

2.

Terry D. Morgan, State Impact Fee Legislation: Guidelines for Analysis, Part I,
Mar. 1990, at 3.
3. 560 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1997).
4. See id. at 682.
5. This article does not attempt to address other means of recovering the cost
to municipalities of new development, such as the use of tax increment financing.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 469.176, subd. 4(d) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (authorizing that tax
increment derived from housing district may be used to finance cost of public
improvements directly related to a housing project); MrNN. STAT. §§ 444.075-.26
(1996 & Supp. 1997) (authorizing that a municipality may create storm sewer district
in which taxes may be imposed for purposes of constituting and maintaining storm
sewer systems and related facilities).
6. See generally Blaesser & Kentopp, supra note 1, at 64 (describing the
results of a survey of 109 local governments in Illinois). The survey results
indicate misperceptions about the meaning of the term "impact fee." Forty-two
LAND USE LAw,

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 24

are common to other forms of exactions. Nevertheless, differences
exist. The Minnesota Supreme Court has defined an impact fee as a
type of exaction which is:
*

in the form of a predetermined money payment;

" assessed as a condition to the issuance of a building
permit, an occupancy permit or plat approval;
* pursuant to local government powers to regulate
new growth and development and to provide for
adequate public facilities and services;
* levied to fund large-scale, off-site public facilities
and services necessary to serve new development;
* in an amount which is proportionate to the need for
public facilities generated by the new development.7
These elements
set impact fees apart from ad valorem taxes,8 special
9
assessments, excise taxes, and other forms of exactions, such as
.10

percent of the local governments who reported using impact fees were not
actually administering impact fees, as the term was defined in the survey.
Conversely, twenty percent of the governments who said that they did not utilize
impact fees were actually doing so, according to the survey definition. See id.
7. Country Joe, 560 N.W.2d at 685 (quoting Brian W. Blaesser & Christine M.
Kentopp, Impact Fees: The "Second Generation," in 1991 ZONING AND PLANNING
HANDBOOK 255, 264 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1991)).
8. Ad valorem taxes, like other taxes, are revenue raising measures subject to
the limitations of the Minnesota Constitution, which requires that "[t]axes shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects and shall be levied and collected for public
purposes .... " MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1. Tax levies are designed to promote the
requirements of general government and similarly classified persons or properties
are therefore expected to bear equal shares of the cost of government. See Hassler v.
Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 490, 48 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1951); see also State v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14, 20 (D. Minn. 1938).
9. Special assessments are primarily one-time apportionments of public
improvement costs to properties that derive a special benefit from the improvement.
When the cost of the improvement exceeds the value of the benefit, an
unconstitutional taking occurs. See Tri-State Land Co. v. City of Shoreview, 290
N.W.2d 775, 776 (Minn. 1980) (remanding for consideration of whether benefits to
plaintiff from storm sewer for which plaintiff paid a higher per acre assessment than
its neighbors equaled plaintiff's cost); Buettner v. City of St. Cloud, 277 N.W.2d 199,
200 (Minn. 1979) (finding a court may independently review the trial court's
determination of whether an assessment constitutes an unconstitutional taking).
10. Excise taxes are not based on the assessed value of property, but on one act,
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fees-in-lieu of dedication," utility fees, connection charges3 and
linkages. While impact fees are readily distinguishable from taxes
and assessments, they are less distinguishable from other forms of
exactions, including such charges as sewer access charges (SAC
charges) .15
The importance of defining and distinguishing impact fees from
revenue raising measures and other exactions cannot be overstated.
event, or occurrence.

See Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 307 (Colo.

1989).
Like ad valorem taxes, excise taxes must conform to constitutional
uniformity requirements. See State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Spaeth, 223 Minn. 218,
221, 26 N.W.2d 115, 116 (1947).
11. Fees-in-lieu of dedication are authorized by statute in Minnesota. See MINN.
STAT. § 462.358, subd. 2b (1996). While dedications of park land are permitted as
on-site exactions, money in lieu of land has been exacted for off-site park
improvements where the subdivision is too small to justify a land dedication or
where a subdivision creates a need for a new park outside the geographic area of the
subdivision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the reasonable
relationship test in upholding the constitutionality of park dedications. See Collis v.
City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 13-14, 246 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1976); see also infra
notes 82-89 and accompanying text for discussion of Collis. In-lieu-of fees meet the
characteristics of impact fees adopted in CountryJoe. See 560 N.W.2d at 685.
12. At least in Colorado, transportation utility fees are subject to constitutional
uniformity requirements. See Bloom, 784 P.2d at 309. In Bloom, the fee was assessed
for the purpose of providing revenues for the maintenance of local streets, was
imposed under a formula established by ordinance, and was charged to owners and
occupants of developed lots fronting on city streets. See id. at 305-06.
13. Connection charges have been used in Minnesota to collect money from
property owners when sewer and water connections are made to new and existing
developments. They can be charged even though special assessments may be
voided, or may be charged in addition to special assessments. They have been used
to recoup costs allocated by the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission. See
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. City of Lakeville, 313 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 1982).
Connection charges are authorized by state statute in Minnesota. See MNN. STAT. §
444.075, subd. 3 (1996).
14. Linkages, one of the newest forms of an exaction, are also distinguishable
from impact fees. The underlying basis for linkage fees is that development in one
area of a city leads to the requirement of a companion development project
elsewhere in the city. A prime example is a downtown office project that leads to an
increased need for off-site housing. See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, And
Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Perspective, 20 UIB. LAw. 515, 524 (1988). A city
would condition approval of an office project on a linked housing project
development. See id. This type of linkage is rationalized on the basis that the office
project will attract new residents to the city, thereby decreasing the amount of
available housing stock. See id. The developer is thus required to provide additional
housing or funds to help create the housing. Unlike linkages requiring additional
private development as a condition for project approval, impact fees are used to
ensure that a development project pays for its fair share of the cost of providing
necessary off-site public services and infrastructure. See Richard J. Roddewig, Recent
Developments in Land Use, Planningand Zoning Law, 22 URB. LAw. 719, 779 (1990).
15. See Taub, supranote 14, at 524.
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At least one survey suggests that those local governments that
believed they were using impact fees were not, and those that
believed they were not using impact fees actually were. 16 In
Minnesota, for example, while a city insisted that its road unit
connection charge was an impact fee, the state supreme court
decided that the failure to utilize a needs and benefits standard
meant that the charge was really a general revenue raising measure.17
The question of whether a charge is a regulatory fee has been
addressed by courts in Colorado,"' Florida,19 and Idaho.' ° The
distinction implicates important constitutional limitations, and is
rooted in fundamental differences between taxing authority and
regulatory authority.2
III. AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE IMPACT FEES AND EXACTIONS IN
GENERAL

Traditionally, local governmental authority to operate was
deemed to be subject to "Dillon's Rule,"22 which states:
16. See supranote 6.
17. See CountryJoe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681,686 (Minn. 1997).
18. See Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 304-05 (Colo. 1989). In
holding a transportation utility fee to be a valid special fee rather than a tax subject
to constitutional uniformity requirements, the Colorado Supreme Court
distinguished a fee from an ad valorem tax, an excise tax, and a special assessment.
See id. at 309-11.
19. See Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County, Inc. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The
Florida appeals court candidly pointed out that, "[a]s one reads the various cases
involving the dichotomy between a fee and a tax the distinction almost seems to
become more amorphous rather than less." Id.
20. See Idaho Building Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 890 P.2d
326, 330 (Idaho 1994). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a
purported fee imposed to pay for libraries, police, fire, and streets was designed to
generate revenues to be used for capital improvements throughout the city by all
residents, and not solely for the benefit of those seeking a building permit, and was
therefore actually a tax. See id.
21. See Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712,
716 (Md. 1994). The distinction can become one of form over substance, as may
have happened in Maryland, where a local governmental body was allowed to
accomplish its objectives by adopting a "development impact tax." Id. at 717. In
rejecting an argument that a property tax and impact tax were duplicative, the court
reasoned "that the impact tax is not a tax on property, but rather, a tax on...
developingproperty." Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
22. See Blaesser and Kentopp, supranote 1, at 87; see alsoJohnJ. Delaney, Larry
A. Gordon & Kathryn J. Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test For Validating
Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees And Linkage, 50 LAW & CoNTEw.
PROBs. 139,
146 n.48 (1987).
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that
a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers, and not others: First, those granted in
express words, second, those necessarily orfairly implied in
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply
convenient, but indispensable. 23
In other words, local governments can only exercise authority based
upon express statutory language or home rule charter language.
One of the most important criteria in determining whether or not
impact fees are permissible is whether there is legislative authority to
impose them. 14 If so, although "[s]ubject to the limitations of a
particular jurisdiction, impact fees generally may be used to provide
any public facilities which can reasonably be construed
to fall within
25
state enabling legislation and home rule powers.,
A.

Statutory Authority

Express statutory enabling legislation for impact fees has been
26
•
27
adopted in various states and has been proposed in others.
Impact fee enabling legislation is often limited in scope to larger2
local government jurisdictions, or to specific public improvements. 8
In jurisdictions that have not passed such statutes, impact fees may be
invalidated.2 Conversely, impact fees may be upheld based upon the

23.

Blaesser and Kentopp, supra note 1, at 87 n.89 (quoting 1 J. DILLON,
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911))

COMMENTARIES ON TEI-

(emphasis in original).
24. See id. at 69.
25. Id. at 68.
26.

See id. at 71 n.50. For the states which have enacted impact fee enabling

legislation, see infra note 55.
27. See id. at 71-72 & n.53 (noting an Arizona HB 2648 impact fee bill defeated
during the 1989 legislative session and a Delaware HB 475, 135th Gen. Ass., 1989

transportation impact fee bill).
28. Blaesser and Kentopp, supranote 1, at 71 & nn.51-52.
29. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of Danbury,
273 A.2d 880, 883 (Conn. 1970) (noting a city planning commission may only
exercise powers expressly granted it by statute); Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of
McPherson, 368 P.2d 51, 52 (Kan. 1962) (stating that city governments exist only by

statute and only have the power expressed in the statutes); Middlesex Boston St. Ry.
v. Board of Aldermen, 359 N.E.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Mass. 1977) (overruling board of
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general language of zoning statutes,30 or based upon a city's valid
exercise of its police power authority." The following are examples
of various impact fee laws.
1.

Texas

In 1987, Texas adopted the nation's first comprehensive impact
fee enabling statute.3 ' The act, entitled "Impact Fees for Capital
Improvements or Facility Expansion,""s allows any political
subdivision in Texas to impose impact fees for capital improvements
or facilities expansion.3 4 Permissible capital improvements must
have a life expectancy of at least three years and include water
supply, treatment and distribution facilities; wastewater collection
and treatment facilities; storm water, drainage, and flood control
facilities; and roadway facilities.35 Permissible facilities expansion
includes the expansion
of the capacity of an existing permissible
6
improvement.3

The Texas enabling statute contains very detailed definitions,
applicability standards,
procedures
for adoption,
notice
requirements, limitations on the use of proceeds and refund

Aldermen's decision requiring developer to lease units at discounted rate, as no
express statutory legislation empowered board to make decision); Holmdel Builders
Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 556 A.2d 1236, 1240-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (determining municipality derived no power to levy fees on developers absent
express legislative grant); Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 546
N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing municipality's authority to enact
legislation is limited by the express grant of such authority by the state).
30. # See, e.g., Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 334 A.2d 30, 37-38 (N.J. 1975)
(upholding municipality's decision based on explicit language in zoning statute that
developer be assessed costs associated with off-site drainage facility improvement);
Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1979) (finding city ordinance
requiring subdivider to dedicate percentage of land for use in flood control or pay
equivalent value in cash as within scope of powers granted to city).
31. See, e.g., Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 898 (Wyo. 1988) (finding
legislatively empowered municipality has full authority and control over public water
and sewage systems).
32. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 4-2 (noting the codification of the Act as TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269; now codified as TEX. LOc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
395.041-.055 (West Supp. 1998)).
33. TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODEANN. § 395.041-.055 (West Supp. 1998); see also
Blaesser and Kentopp, supra note 1, at 82 (noting that the establishment of the
Texas Act has served as the model for impact fee legislation in Illinois and Georgia).
34. TEx. Loc. GOv'T CODEANN. § 395.041-.055.
35. See Morgan, supranote 1, at 5-6 & n.3 (citing TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §
395.001(1)).
36. See id. at 6.
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provisions, and other elements, and provides a specific list of the
capital improvements to which impact fees may be applied.37 The
Texas model has been followed in other states.-"
2.

Illinois

In 1987, shortly after Texas adopted its comprehensive impact
fee legislation, Illinois adopted its Road Improvement Impact Fee
statutes39 using the Texas law as a model. In 1989, it was repealed
and replaced by new legislation 4° resulting in a much longer and
more detailed piece of enabling legislation than the previous
41
version.
The 1987 legislation was adopted to allow the larger counties
surrounding Chicago42 to "establish transportation impact districts
and collect transportation impact fees from new developments that
would require direct or indirect access to the state or county highway
system. 43 The 1989 statute can be seen as authorizing a "second
generation" impact fee, distinguishable from "first generation"
impact fees" based on refinements to the elements of statutov basis,
methodology, procedure, scope of coverage, and exemptions. This
second generation of impact fees expanded and refined its
predecessor by recognizing home rule authority to impose impact
fees, removing the population cap to which the earlier legislation
applied, and expanding state control over local government impact

37. See Blaesser and Kentopp, supra note 1, at 82. The Texas Act also provides
that the political subdivision must establish an advisory committee composed of
representatives of the real estate development and building industries. See id.
38. See id. at 82 & n.80 (describing Illinois' Road Improvement Impact Fee
legislation).
39. See id. at 82; see also Transportation Impact Fee Legislation, 121 ILL. COMp.
STAT. ANN. 5/5-608 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989) (repealed 1989).
40. See Road Improvement Impact Fee legislation, 605 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
5/5-901 to 5-918; (repealing 121 ILL. CoMv. STAT. ANN. 5/5-608, effective July 26,
1989).
41. See Blaesser and Kentopp, supra note 1, at 73.
42. The Act applied only to counties with population between 400,000 and
1,000,000. See 121 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 5/5-608 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989)
(repealed 1989).
43. Blaesser and Kentopp, supranote 1, at 74.
44. Illinois' original Transportation Impact Fee Legislation, 121 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/5-608 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989) (repealed 1989).
45. See Blaesser and Kentopp, supra note 1, at 69-71 (describing the judicially
created elements and standards necessary for the implementation of second
generation impact fees).
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fee ordinances.4 The statute contains extensive substantive and
procedural standards, including notice and public hearing
requirements, while also attempting to incorporate the most recent
constitutional tests and standards applicable to valid subdivision
exactions.47
The Texas and Illinois legislation illustrate a willingness on the
part of state legislatures to allow impact fees as a new financing
source for local government infrastructure. At the same time,
however, the procedural requirements and limitations set forth in
these statutes reveal a certain legislative distrust of local governments
when it comes to impact fee ordinances. 48
B. Home Rule Charters
Authority for impact fees may also be found in local enabling
provisions contained in local home rule charters. Unless a state has
expressly preempted local regulation through an exclusive
reservation or intention to occupy a particular subject area, or a local
government is acting outside the scope of its local government
powers, the authority bestowed by a home rule charter may provide
the necessary power to impose impact fees. 49 A local government's
police power authority can often form the basis for the enactment of
various ordinances.5 0 Nevertheless, governments can only "assess
impact fees pursuant to home rule powers if it can be established
that the financing of a particular type of facility or service is a matter
of local concern, and not
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state or
51
other government unit."

C. OtherForms of Authority
Absent an express statutory grant of authority or appropriate
home rule charter authority, local government units must look for
authority to impose impact fees in the idea that they may exercise
powers that are fairly implied or essential to accomplish their
duties.

That is to say:

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 74-75 & nn.61-64.
See id. at 79-80 (citing 121 ILL. Comp. STAT.
See id. at 80, 82.
See id, at 87-89.
See supra note 31.

51.

Blaesser and Kentopp, supra note 1, at 88-89.

52.

See id. at 86; see also Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 22, at 146.
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Generally, non-home rule units of local government
that seek to adopt impact fees other than those
expressly authorized by enabling legislation must rely
on zoning and planning enabling statutes and other
statutes governing the planning and financing of
educational facilities, water and sewer facilities, and
other types of public facilities and services, to the
extent that the authority to adopt impact fees may be
expressly or impliedly "granted to them by law" in
53
these other statutes.
A power from which authority to impose impact fees can be
implied may take a number of forms. Still, express authority
eliminates much of the uncertainty that may otherwise surround the
issue and is therefore preferable from a municipality's point of
view.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

More than twenty states have expressly authorized development
impact fees. 55 Express legislation obviously resolves many authority
53. Blaesser and Kentopp, supranote 1, at 86.
54. But see supra note 29.
55. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1101 (West Supp. 1997-1998)
(defining an impact fee as a "fee imposed on a benefit area by the board to pay
for a proportionate share of the public facilities required to serve the
development."); CAL. Gov.CODE § 66000 (West 1997) (defining an impact fee as
a "fee... that is charged by a local agency to the applicant in connection with
approval of a development project for the purpose of defraying all or a portion of
the cost of public facilities related to the development project.. . ."); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §22-54-102 (1998) (providing for development fees to finance
schools); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-1 (1993) (defining an impact fee as a "payment
of money imposed upon development as a condition of development approval to
pay for a proportionate share of the cost of system improvements needed to serve
new growth and development."); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-141 (1996) (defining
an impact fee as "the charges imposed upon a developer by a county to fund all or
a portion of the public facility capital improvement costs required by the
development from which it is collected, or to recoup the cost of existing facility
capital improvements made in anticipation of the needs of a development");
IDAHO CODE § 67-8102 (Supp. 1997) (providing for a "payment of money imposed
as a condition of development approval to pay for a proportionate share of the
cost of system improvements needed to serve development."); 605 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5-903 (West 1993) (defining an impact fee as a "charge or fee levied or
imposed by a unit of local government as a condition to the issuance of a building
permit... in connection with a new development...."); IND.. CODE ANN. § 36-74-
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issues. Even if the problem of authority is rendered moot by express
legislation or judicially implied power, however, constitutional issues
related to the municipality's regulatory authority may still arise. 5'
Various judicial standards and tests have been developed to

1300 (West 1997) (defining an impact fee as "amonetary charge imposed on new
development by a unit to defray or mitigate the capital costs of infrastructure that
is required by, necessitated by, or needed to serve the new development."); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4354 (West 1996) (providing that "[a] municipality
may enact an ordinance under its home rule authority requiring the construction
of off-site capital improvements or the payment of impact fees...."); MD.CODE
ANN., CORPS. - MUNICIPAL § 44 (1997) (providing for impact fees in connection
with bus financing); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.11532 (West 1997) (providing
for impact fees in connection with solid waste treatment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
674:21 (1996) (defining an impact fee as "a fee or assessment imposed upon
development, including subdivision.., in order to help meet the needs
occasioned by that development for the construction or improvement of capital
facilities.. ..");N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-1 (West Supp. 1997) (providing for "a
fee assessed on development pursuant to an ordinance or resolution .... "); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 5-8-1 (Michie 1993) (providing for "a charge or assessment imposed
by a municipality or county on new development in order to generate revenue for
funding or recouping the costs of capital improvements or facility expansions
necessitated by and attributable to the new development."); OR. REV. STAT. §
391.235 (1996) (defining an impact fee as "that portion of a charge or fee
adopted and assessed against development for the purpose of funding streets,
roads and related improvements that principally provide for automobile
circulation."); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10502-A (West 1997) (defining an impact
fee as "a charge or fee imposed by a municipality against new development in
order to generate revenue for funding the costs of transportation capital
improvements necessitated by and attributable to new development"); TEX. Loc.
Gov'T CODE ANN. § 395.001 (West Supp. 1998) (providing for "a charge or
assessment imposed by a political subdivision against new development in order
to generate revenue for funding or recouping the costs of capital improvements
or facility expansions necessitated by and attributable to the new development.");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-36-101 (1996) (providing for "a payment of money imposed
upon development activity as a means of development approval."); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 5201 (1992) (defining an impact fee as a "fee levied as a condition of
issuance of a zoning or subdivision permit which will be used to cover any portion
of the costs of an existing or planned capital project.., or to compensate the
municipality for any expenses it incurs as a result of construction); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 82.02.050 (Michie Supp. 1998) (providing for a "payment of money imposed
upon development as a condition of development approval to pay for public
facilities needed to serve new growth and development.. . ."); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN.
§ 82.02.050 (1997) (providing for impact fees to cover capital
improvements); W. VA. CODE § 7-20-3 (1997) (providing for impact fees to cover
capital improvements); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.55 (West Supp. 1997) (providing for
"cash contributions, contributions of land or interests in land or any other items
of value that are imposed on a developer by a political subdivision ....
").
56. See, e.g., CountryJoe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 687 n.7 (Minn.
1997) (stating that "[b]ecause we conclude that the road unit connection charge is
unauthorized under Minnesota law, we need not reach the contractor's argument
that the charge is an unconstitutional taking withoutjust compensation.").
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determine the constitutional validity of imposing exactions. Among
the most significant of the cases passingjudgment on this issue is the7

Commission.1
1987 Supreme Court case of Nollan v. California Coastal

The Nollan opinion held that development exactions constitute a
"taking" unless they "substantially advance" a legitimate state purpose
and there is an "essential nexus" between the public purpose of the
land use action and the conditions attached to the approval of the
58
In Nolan, the court invalidated a beach access
development.
exaction, on the grounds that it was completely unrelated to the
purpose for which it was required.59 Nollan also raised the specter of
a heightened scrutiny test where a condition of development
approval leads to a permanent physical occupation or requires
conveyance of title to the property.
Over the years, state courts have developed a variety of tests for
evaluating the constitutionality of exactions. 61 Still, the long-term
effect of Nollan on these tests is likely to be somewhat limited as the
opinion cites a long list 6of state standards that are deemed to be
2
constitutionally sufficient.
Florida courts, for example, have had no difficulty in implying
the power for both statutory and home-rule charter local
63
In the District Court of Appeals of Florida, the
governments.
Fourth District found implied authority to impose a regulatory fee
for roads from broad state constitutional and statutory provisions
governing non-charter county governments. 64 The issue of whether
the fee imposed was really a tax was resolved in favor of the county
because of restrictions in the ordinance, including the fact that the
57.
58.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 834, 837.

59.

Id. at 841.

60.

DAVID L. CALLiES & ROBERT H. FREIIH, CASES & MATERIALS ON LAND.USE 84

n.3 (1986 & Supp. 1991). Thus, if a taking is involved, the heightened scrutiny test
under Nolkan will apply. See also Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 727

(Wyo. 1985), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 110 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance
against a second constitutional attack) for an application of the heightened scrutiny
test where the condition of trimming a tree to comply with the zoning ordinance was
directly tied to the "legitimate public interest" Cheyenne was attempting to protect.
61. See CALLEs & FREILIcH, supra note 60, at 372.
62. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839-40; see also CAUSES & FREnICH, supra note 60, at
84-85 n.4.
63. See Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of Palm Beach County
Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).

64. See id. at 143. The Home Builders court held "that Palm Beach County had
the power and authority to enact the fee impact ordinance in question, assuming
the ordinance involves a regulatory fee rather than a tax." Id.
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"expenditure
of the funds collected is localized by virtue of the zone
65
system."
Legal authority has also been found under the statutory power
of home rule charter counties in Florida to adopt charter provisions
that allow park dedications for new developments. 66 In Hollywood,
Inc. v. Broward County,67 the court recognized that "[i]n the absence
of preemptive federal or state statutory or constitutional law, the
paramount law of a charter county is its charter. " r
A.

Takings in State Courts
1.

The Specifically and Uniquely Attributable Test

Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Nollan v.
CaliforniaCoastal Commission,61 legal standards applicable to exactions
were largely developed by state courts.0
The most restrictive
standard, sometimes referred to as the "specifically and uniquely
attributable test," was first adopted in a 1961 Illinois case. 7 ' The test
remains in use today, as the Illinois Supreme Court recently
demonstrated in upholding the second of two enabling acts
authorizing counties to impose transportation impact fees on new
development.
In doing so, the court had no difficulty in

65. Id. at 145. But see Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So.
2d 314, 320 (Fla. 1976) (stating that '[r]aising expansion capital by setting
connection charges, which do not exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated
costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion is reasonably required, if use of the
money collected is limited to meeting the costs of expansion") (emphasis in original). In the
instant case, since the new users had to share the cost of retiring certificates used to
finance the original facilities, the ordinance was declared invalid. See id. at 321. "If
the ordinance in the present case had [properly] restricted use of the fee .... there
would be little question as to its validity." Id. The ordinance was later amended and
upheld. See City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 358 So. 2d 846, 848
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
66. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
67. 431 So. 2d at 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
68. Id. at 609.
69. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
70. See infra Section IV.B and note 90.
71. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d. 799,
802 (Ill. 1961). The court held that a requirement is permissible if it is written
within the municipality's statutory grant of power and if the burden on the
subdivider is "specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity." Id.
72. See Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 649
N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ill. 1995).
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recognizing "that the need to minimize or reduce traffic congestion
is a legitimate state interest., 73 The extent of the exaction required
to satisfy
impact was considered the more difficult
S 74the projected
..
question. Relying on the specifically and uniquely attributable test,
the court stated that "if the local government cannot demonstrate
that its exaction is directly proportionalto the specifically created need, the

exaction becomes 'a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain
and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police
regulations'.,75
2.

The Rational Nexus Test

A more moderate approach relies on the rational nexus
standard. Florida's adoption of this test is typical. In Hollywood, Inc.
v. Broward County,76 the court reviewed its earlier opinions 77 from
which it "discern[ed] the general legal principle that reasonable
dedications or impact fee requirements are permissible so long as
they offset needs sufficiently attributable to the subdivision and so
long as the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for the
substantial benefit of the subdivision residents.
Hence, impact fees
are permissible in Florida if the local government can "demonstrate
a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the need for
additional capital facilities and the growth in population generated
by the subdivision."79 The local government must also "show a
reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures
80
of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision."
73.

Id. at 389 (citations omitted).

74.

See id.

75. Id. at 381 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The court also stated
that under the test, a county "can only impose impact fees for the road
improvements made necessary by the additional traffic generated by the new
development... [and] the new development paying the impact fee must receive a
direct and materialbenefit from the improvement financed by the impact fee." Id. at
390 (emphasis in original). But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994)
(stating "[w] e do not think the Federal Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny,
given the nature of the interests involved.").
76.

431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).

77.

See id. at 610-11 (reviewing Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338

So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1977); Admiral
Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); City of
Dunedin v. Contractors and Builders Ass'n, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),

cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979)).
78.
79.

Broward Co., 431 So. 2d at 611.
Id.

80.

Id. at 611-12.
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The ReasonableRelationship Test

The third standard is often and perhaps understandably
The Minnesota
confused with the rational nexus standard.8 '
Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota reasonable relationship
standard in Collis v. City of Bloomington,s2 a case which upheld a
subdivision park dedication ordinance. 8 The Collis court considered
whether statutory authorization for dedication of land84 and a city
ordinance implementing that authority"' constituted a taking of
property withoutjust compensation in violation of the United States
The Bloomington ordinance
and Minnesota Constitutions. s6
required each developer to pay ten percent of undeveloped land
value or contribute ten percent of the land to the city."7 The Court
recognized that a developer might be required to pay a
disproportionate share of the city's park costs, but that as applied to
the specific developer in question the requirement was not
unreasonable.88

81. In Broward Co., 431 So. 2d at 611 n.5, the court contended that the rational
nexus test was advanced, at least in part, in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,
137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). In Collis v. City of
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976), the Minnesota Supreme Court
showed a different understanding of Jordan, when it "decline[d] to follow the
extreme approaches of the Illinois and Montana cases... We choose instead to
follow the lead of Wisconsin [Jordan], California, and New York, and those cases
which hold that a reasonable relationship between the approval of the subdivision
and the municipality's need for land is required." Id. at 18, 246 N.W.2d at 26.
82. 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976).
83. Id. at 19, 246 N.W.2d at 28.
84. See MINN. STAT. § 462.358, subd.2 (1971). Subdivision 2 was repealed in
1980 and the dedication authorization now exists as MINN. STAT. § 462.358 subd. 2b
(1996).
85. See Bloomington City Code, § 20.0911B.
86. Collis, 310 Minn. at 9-10, 246 N.W.2d at 21-22.
87. See id. at 9, 246 N.W.2d at 21.
88. See id. at 20, 246 N.W.2d at 27.
While the city has apparently made a record in this case
showing that 10 percent is not unreasonable as to the property
of these plaintiffs, given the particular needs of Bloomington, a
10 percent requirement might be arbitrary as a matter of law
because it does not consider the relationship between this
particular subdivision and recreational need in the community
as required by the Pioneer Trust [Illinois] and Jordan
[Wisconsin] cases.
Id. Because the Bloomington ordinance stated "as a general rule, it is reasonable to
require" a ten percent dedication, the court concluded that it was not facially
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Whether the subtle differences separating these three standards
are well understood is open to debate. In any event, those
differences may be more important on an academic level than in
practice, because the reasonable relationship standard "consider[s] a
myriad of factors"89 which can include factors encompassing the
same considerations used under the specifically and uniquely
attributable and rational nexus standards.
B. Taking in FederalCourts

Before 1987, federal court decisions contributed little to
discussions concerning the appropriate standards to apply in
exactions cases, perhaps out of judicial reluctance to interfere in
local affairs.90 Indeed, when the United States Supreme Court broke
its silence in Nollan v. CalforniaCoastal Commisszon9 ' and adopted the
"essential nexus" test, Justice Brennan, in dissent, declared that
"[s]uch a narrow conception of rationality... has long since been
discredited as a judicial arrogation of legislative authority. 92 In
subsequent years, that traditional reluctance largely disappeared.
1.

The EssentialNexus Test

In Nollan, a building permit condition required the owner to
dedicate an easement to the public along the shoreline.93 This
requirement was found to be a taking because the "essential nexus"
between the regulation and legitimate state interests could not be
established.9 According to the majority, "the lack of nexus between
the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction [to
allow the public access along the beach to enjoy the natural beauty of
the ocean] converts that purpose to something other than what it

unconstitutional. Id. The court added that the constitutionality of the ordinance
remained open to attack in judicial review proceedings on "as applied to plaintiffs'
property" grounds. Id. at 21, 246 N.W.2d at 28.
Id. at 18, 246 N.W.2d at 26.
89.
90. In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided three important cases
involving regulation and the takings clause. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Nollan v. California Coastal

Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
91.
92.
93.
94.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 846 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
See id. at 828 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Id. at 837.
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was. 95 To avoid payment of compensation under the Fifth
Amendment's property clause, regulation through the police power
must substantially advance a legitimate state interest, and the
connection between the state96 interest and the regulation becomes
the focus of a court's inquiry.
2.

The Rough ProportionalityTest

In 1994, a question left unanswered in Nollan was resolved by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dolan v. City of
Tigard.97 The Oregon Supreme Court had held that the City of
Tigard could, as a condition of a building permit, require that part
of the owner's land be dedicated for flood control and traffic
improvements. 9s In Dolan, the heart of the matter was "the required
degree of connection between the exactions [imposed by the city]
and the projected impact of the proposed development."99
The Court had no difficulty in determining that an essential
nexus existed between the permit conditions and the legitimate state
interests of
S 100dealing with stormwater run-off and reducing traffic
congestion.
In evaluating the necessary degree of connection,
however, the Court adopted the substance of the reasonable
relationship test previously used in Collis.1M Denominating this test
the "rough proportionality" test, the court held that, "[n]o precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in10 2 nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."

95.

Id,

96.

See id. at 841-42.

97.

512 U.S. 374 (1994).

98.
99.

See id. at 383.
Id. at 386.

100.

See id.at 387-88.

101. See id. at 391 ("[W]e think the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a
majority of state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of
those previously discussed."); see also supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text. The
Dolan Court rejected the specific and uniquely attributable test and other state

approaches said to be nothing more than "very generalized statements as to the
necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed
development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389. At least for federal constitutional purposes,

Dolan eliminated any distinctions between the reasonable relationship and rational
nexus tests.
102.

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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C. Nollan and Dolan in State Courts
1. Adjudicative and Legislative Decisions
After the Supreme Court of Arizona directed the Arizona Court
of Appeals to evaluate a water resource development in light of
Dolan, the court of appeals upheld the fee charged by the city of
Scottsdale. 103 In determining the applicability of Dolan, the court
implied that Dolan did apply to regulatory fees.'0 Noting that "the
Scottsdale ordinance involve [d] a legislative, rather than an
adjudicative determination,"
the court of appeals
concluded106 that
. ...
10"5
Dolan was limited to adjudicative decisions.
On appeal,
the
Arizona Supreme Court agreed, stating that "[t]he risk of...
leveraging [the landowners] does not exist when the exaction is
embodied in a generally applicable legislative decision."0 7
2. Possessoryand Non-Possessoy Regulations
California courts have also reviewed the applicability of both
Nollan and Dolan to impact fees.18 In CommercialBuilders of Northern
Californiav. City of Sacramento,"' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found an adequate nexus to satisfy Nollan where an ordinance
imposed a development fee to help fund low-income housing
needed for workers who were arriving to take jobs on new projects.
In reviewing the problems of other courts, the court noted that
"[n] one [of the other circuits] have interpreted [Nollan]j as changing
the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulations that do not
constitute a physical encroachment of land."" The California Court
103. See Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d
1347, 1352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
104. See id. at 1350 ("If the fees constitute a land-use regulation, eminent
domain is implicated. If the fees are a tax, however, they are not subject to the
Takings Clause.").
105. Id. at 1351. "While Dolan also involved a city ordinance, the crucial
distinction lies in the amount of adjudicative, staff-level discretion permitted by each
ordinance." Id.
106. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
994 (Ariz. 1997).
107. Id at 1000.
108. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872
(9th Cr. 1991).
109. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
110. See id. at 872-73.
111. Id. at 874.
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of Appeals took a similar approach in upholding a traffic exaction
ordinance, reasoning that the exaction in Nollan was possessory and
that "any heightened scrutiny test contained in Nollan
[was] limited
112
cases."
takings
regulatory
than
rather
to possessory
Several years later, in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,"' a case with a
complex procedural history, the California Supreme Court rejected
the simple proposition that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to cases
involving monetary exactions. 114
In Ehrlich, the rough
proportionality test of Dolan was held to applyS to115 non-possessory
exactions that are individual and discretionary.
The court
nonetheless concluded that "it is not at all clear that the rationale ...
of Nollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the exaction takes the
form of a generally applicable development fee... [where] the courts
have deferred to legislative and political processes .... ,,1 16
3. ReasonableRelationship,EssentialNexus, and Rough
Proportionality
Although courts have referenced the heightened scrutiny
required by Nollan and Dolan, the rigor of the essential nexus and
rough proportionality tests is probably somewhat exaggerated.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Nollan portrayed the majority view as a
radical departure from traditional rationality standards used in
112. Blue Jeans Equities W. v. City and County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
114, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
113. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
114. See id. at 433.
115. See id. at 444. Under the court's view of "the consolidated 'essential nexus'
and 'rough proportionality' tests, it matters little whether the local land use permit
authority demands the actual conveyance of property or the payment of a monetary
exaction." Id.
116. Id. at 447. The court added:
[W]hen a local government imposes special, discretionary
permit conditions on development by individual property
owners--as in the case of the recreational fee at issue in this
case-Nollan and Dolan require that such conditions, whether
they consist of possessory dedications or monetary exactions, be
scrutinized under the heightened standard.
Id. See also Loyola Marymount Univ. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr.
2d 424, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The California Court of Appeals noted that both
Commercial Builders and Blue Jeans Equities involved "legislatively formulated
assessments imposed on a broad class of property owners." Id. at 434. Since the
school development fees at issue were of this type, the heightened scrutiny standards
of Nollan and Dolan did not apply. See id. at 434-35.
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police power cases,117 and Justice Steven's dissent observed that
"[e]ven the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great8
uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence.""
Similarly, Justice Steven's dissent in Dolan as to the rough
proportionality test asserted that "[n] ot one of the state cases cited by
the Court•)119
announces anything akin to a 'rough proportionality'
requirement."
Further examination of the test's application
however, suggests that Justices Stevens and Brennan had less to fear
than they might have originally thought.
When the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the impact of Dolan
in Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsda1k120 it
2
referred to state court decisions, including Collis1
and Jordan,

as

producing a widely accepted standard. 123 That standard referred to
as the dual nexus test "requires first that the exaction imposed on
the developer be factually related to the need for public services
created by the proposed development. Second, the nature and
extent of the exaction must bear a reasonable relationship to that
portion of the public burden created by the proposed
development. " 12 4 The latter half of this test, the court concluded, is
embodied in the Dolanrough proportionality test.125
In California, while judicial application of Nollan similarly tends
to minimize the effect of that case, Ehrlich1 6 suggests tests for such

relationships. Ehrlich additionally speculates that "Nollan and Dolan
cast substantial doubt on the sufficiency of the [California
reasonable relationship test],"12 7 and that the objective of the
standards is still to assure that the regulatory fee will advance a

117. Nollan v. California Costal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842-64 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
118. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
119.
120.
121.

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 398 (1994) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997).
Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976); see supra

notes 81-88 and accompanying text for discussion of the Collis case.
122.
123.

Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 442 (Wis. 1965).
Home Builders Ass'n, 930 P.2d at 997.

124. Id.
125. See id. at 1000. "Adopting the predominant test developed by the state
courts, the Supreme Court held that the exaction must bear a roughly proportional
relationship to the community burden created by the proposed development.
'Roughly proportional' is actually a term substituted for 'reasonable
relationship' .... " Id. at 999.
126. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
127.

Id. at 437.
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legitimate state interest and be proportional to the impact.""8 In
29
general, however, most earlier state court decisions, such as CollisI
and Jordan, can be seen as consistent with Nollan13 and Dolan.
4. Nollan, Dolan, and the Specifically and Uniquely Attributable
Test
In Dolan, the majority rejected the specifically and uniquely
attributable test, declaring that "[w] e do not think the Federal
Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny .... ,,l33 A number of
states
previously
relied
on this more
stringent
test, including
Tl"
• had
134
TI
135
T
138
-137
a "l
l
llinois,
New Hampshire,
New Jersey,
Ohio, and Rhode
Island. 13 Under this standard, "[t]he new development paying the
impact fee... must receive a direct and material benefit from the...
improvement constructed with the impact fees paid." 13 9 Whether

128.

See id. To accomplish this
Nollan requires a reviewing court to scrutinize the instrumental
efficacy of the permit condition in order to determine whether
it logically furthers the same regulatory goal as would outright
denial of a development permit. A court must also, under the
standard formulated in Dolan, determine whether the factual
findings made by the permitting body support the condition as
one that is more or less proportional, in both nature and scope,
to the public impact of the proposed development.

Id. at 438-39. See generally Building Indus. Ass'n of S. Cal. v. City of Oxnard, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 769, 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding growth capital fee); Blue Jeans
Equities W. v. City & County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 115 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (upholding traffic impact fee); Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of
Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding fee for low-income
housing needs).
129. Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976).
130. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 445 (Wis. 1965).
131. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). "Our conclusion ... is consistent with the approach
taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception of
the California state courts." Id. at 839.
132. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
133. Id. at 390.
134. See Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d
384, 394 (Ill 1995).
135. SeeJ.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981).
136. See Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Township of Wayne, 34 A.2d 30,
40 (N.J. 1975).
137. See McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1971).
138. SeeFrank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (R.I. 1970).
139. Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n, 649 N.E.2d at 389-90 (quoting 605 Ill.
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judicial adherence to this standard will continue in the face of the
United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on the subject
remains to be seen.
D. Equal Protection andDue Process

Most challenges to impact fee statutes and ordinances have
been made under state and federal takings standards.
The
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process clauses
provide a separate and independent means of attack on these
regulations, but the fact that they trigger a lower level of scrutiny
than takings claimsperhaps explains why there are fewer of these
types of challenges.
Some examples are instructive.
1.

Equal Protection

The United States District Court in North Carolina and the
Ohio Court of Appeals have applied rational basis analysis to impact
fees with differing results.' 4 ' In South Shell Investors v. Town of

Comp. Stat. 5/5-903 (West 1992)).
140. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver, 911 P.2d. 429, 437-38 (Cal. 1996). The court
stated that
[t]he high court's recent takings jurisprudence, as we
comprehend it, underlines the separate nature of the takings
clause as an independent constitutional guarantee, one that is not
only distinct from the commands of the due process and equal
protection provisions of the federal Constitution, but which
embodies a standard of judicial review that is greater than the
'minimal level of scrutiny' mandated by those provisions.
Id. at 437.
141. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified eleven years after the
adoption of the Minnesota Constitution. The Minnesota Constitution contains no
equal protection clause. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court has found an
equal protection principle in the Minnesota Constitution, though its interpretation
has not been uniform. That court has suggested that the state's constitution
requires a "more stringent" constitutional test for rational basis review than does the
federal constitution. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991). The
court acknowledged that it "has not been consistent in explaining whether the
rational basis standard under Minnesota law, although articulated differently, is
identical to the federal standard or represents a less deferential standard under the
Minnesota Constitution." Id. In any event, whether challenged under the
Minnesota Constitution's Article I, section 2 (rights and privileges), or Article X
(uniformity in taxation), rationally based classifications are generally upheld as
constitutional. See Village of Burnsville v. Ornischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn.
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Wrightsville Beach,14 impact fees imposed on owners of newly
developed property to cover the costs of water and sewer systems
were held not to violate equal protection even though the
improvements benefited all residents in the municipality.
The
federal district court noted that "[t]he principles of law enunciated
in Nolan... involve the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
are not directly applicable. ..

."'

Thus, the plaintiff's burden in

challenging the constitutionality of impact fees could be met "only
by showing that there is no 'conceivable basis which may support'
the Town's actions." 145 After reviewing the sewer and water demand
figures, the court concluded that the Town had a rational basis to
impose the fees. 146
Taking a different view, the Ohio Court of Appeals struck down
tax.147
a park impact fee ordinance, holding that the measure was a
Significantly, the court noted that one provision of the ordinance
authorized the city to use impact fee revenues solely on operation
and maintenance of existing facilities. 48 Because there was no
guarantee that the fees would benefit new development, the court
concluded that "....

it is not fair or reasonable to shift the funding of

the present recreation system from the general public to the
developers

and

purchasers

of new construction.'

49

Because

residents of existing housing and commercial buildings would also
be using the city's recreational facilities, the ordinance violated
the
150
equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
Ultimately, whether the basis for treating new residents
differently from established residents is rational may have more to
do with a court's sense of who can more equitably bear the burden
of the cost of new capital improvements than with deference to
legislative decision-making.
For example, in Building Industry
Association v. City of Oxnard, the California Court of Appeals wrote
1974) (stating that "[tihe uniformity clause [is] no more restrictive than the equal
protection clause").
142. 703 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
143. Id. at 1201.
144. Id. at 1201 n.5.
145. Id. at 1201.
146. See id. at 1201-03.
147. See Building Indus. Ass'n of Cleveland & Suburban Counties v. City of
Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 506.
151. 267 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss3/1
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that".., where a landowner develops property in a city with existing
public facilities it is difficult to see why a fee may not be exacted to
purchase more such facilities to maintain the proper balance
between the number of people
in the community and the amount of
52
public facilities available.'
2. Due Process
The city of Modesto, California, was held not to have violated
the due process of developers when it established impact fees after
the city approved a tentative map.15 As the court noted, "[a] pproval
of the tentative or final map.., does not necessarily confer on a
developer a vested right to complete the subdivision free from new
[impact fees] .,,54 Although the city could not have conditioned map
approval on payment of the fees, since it had none at the time, it was
not later barred from conditioning issuance of building permits on
payment of impact fees under the due process clause of the
55
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
V.

THE MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE: BEFORE COUNTRYJOE

A. Exaction EnablingLegislation in Minnesota
Cities and other subdivisions in Minnesota possess some
authority to impose and utilize what arguably may be classified as
exactions for a variety of purposes.
Subdivision approval in
Minnesota may be conditioned on fulfillment of a variety of
requirements, including the construction of sewers and streets,
electric, gas, drainage, and water facilities, and similar utilities.1 56 The
statute also allows a city to require a developer to dedicate land for
parks or pay the equivalent value in cash in lieu of the land
dedication.

152. Id. at 772.
153. See Golden State Home Building Assocs. v. City of Modesto, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
572, 579-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

154.

Id at 575.

155. See id. at 579-80; see also Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d
253, 263 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that when municipal officials insisted upon payment
of impact fees required by county ordinance, developers could not prevail on claim
that their civil rights were violated in absence of a showing that officials' actions were
motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive).
156. See MINN. STAT. § 462.358, subd. 2b (1996).
157. See id. This section of the statute is often utilized in situations of a small
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In situations where a need for off-site infrastructure is created by
new development, cities are authorized to pass on to land developers
and builders the sewer availability charge (SAC) imposed by the
Metropolitan Waste Control Commission for the construction of off15
site sewer interceptors necessitated by the project development. 8
Further, cities are also authorized to impose charges for connection
159
to existing off-site sanitary sewer, storm sewer and water mains.
Keeping in mind the general notions and restraints of Dillon's
Rule,' 60 limited authority arguably exists under legislative grants of
zoning or other authority for the imposition of development
exactions. 161 Nonetheless, courts are unlikely to construe Minnesota
Statutes section 462.358 as granting any 162
authority to impose specific
impact fees such as road access charges.
The only other source of
subdivision development, where the dedication of a very small portion of land would
not be in the public interest.
158. SeeMiNN. STAT. § 473.521 (1997).
159. See MINN. STAT. § 444.075, subd. 3 (1997).
160. See supra note 22-23 and accompanying text.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Mayor & Township Comm. of
Bernards Township, 528 A.2d 555, 562 (N.J. 1987). There, a road access charge
based upon the number of trips generated by a new development was invalidated
because the NewJersey enabling legislation, similar to Minnesota Statutes section
462.358, did not explicitly authorize the road access impact fee. See id. at 562.
New Jersey's enabling legislation at issue in New Jersey Builders Ass'n is similar to
section 462.358 of the Minnesota statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-42 (West
1991):
The governing body may by ordinance adopt regulations
requiring a developer, as a condition for approval of a
subdivision or site plan, to pay his pro-rata share of the cost of
providing only reasonable and necessary street improvements
and water, sewerage and drainage facilities, and easements
therefor, located outside the property limits of the subdivision
or development but necessitated or required by construction or
improvements within such subdivision or development.

Compare MINN.

STAT.

§ 462.358 (1997):

To protect and promote the public health, safety, and general
welfare, to provide for the orderly, economic, and safe
development of land, to preserve agricultural lands, to promote
the availability of housing affordable to persons and families of
all income levels, and to facilitate adequate provision for
transportation, water, sewage, storm drainage, schools, parks,
playgrounds, and other public services and facilities, a
municipality may by ordinance adopt subdivision regulations
establishing standards, requirements, and procedures for the
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enabling authority that cities can look to is the general welfare clause
("police power")1 ' in the statutes governing statutory cities'64 or the
general welfare clause contained in most home rule charters.
B. JudicialInterpretationofExactions in Minnesota

Minnesota judicial interpretation of exactions has historically
not been as demanding as that of other jurisdictions. Prior to
Country Joe, the leading cases in Minnesota were Collis v. City of
Bloomington165 and Middlemist v. City of Plymouth.
Both dealt with

land dedication requirements that were a condition for plat
approval. In Collis, a developer was required to dedicate ten percent
of his land for parks or to pay an equivalent amount in cash in lieu of
the dedication. 167 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a park
dedication requirement in conjunction with the approval of a plat
would constitute a taking unless the dedication required was
proportional to the need created by the subdivision. In Middlemist,
the developer was required to dedicate land for a county road. 169
The court held that a taking would result unless the need for the

review and approval or disapproval of subdivisions.
The
regulations may contain varied provisions respecting, and be
made applicable only to, certain classes or kinds of subdivisions.
163.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

164.

See MINN.

STAT.

§ 412.221, subd. 32 (1996). The statute provides:

The council shall have power to provide for the government

and good order of the city, the suppression of vice and
immorality, the prevention of crime, the protection of public

and private property, the benefit of residence, trade, and
commerce, and the promotion of health, safety, order,
convenience, and the general welfare by such ordinances not

inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States
or of this state as it shall deem expedient.
Id.
165. 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976).
166. 387 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
167. See Colis, 310 Minn. at 82, 246 N.W.2d at 21. The court cautioned that the
ten percent (10%) dedication requirement may be arbitrary in some circumstances
because it does not account for the relationship between the particular subdivision
and the need created by the development. See id. at 20, 246 N.W.2d at 30.
168. Id. at 19, 246 N.W.2d at 26.
169. Middlemist, 387 N.W.2d at 192.
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road was "sufficiently related" to the development plat. 17 In doing
so, the court rejected the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test
adopted elsewhere.'
It is not entirely clear what to call the test the
court adopted in Collis,17' but the important point is that the validity
of the enabling legislation was upheld.'
C. Impact Fees in Minnesota-Are They Valid?
There is no explicit statutory authority for cities or other
political subdivisions in Minnesota to impose impact fees on
developers. As a result, unless authority is found in home rule
charter language or can be necessarily implied from some other
statutory authority, municipalities do not have authority to impose
impact fees in Minnesota. There have been various recent attempts,
all dealing with street access charges, to enact impact fee enabling
legislation in Minnesota. All have failed.
In 1987 a bill was introduced which allowed home rule or
statutory cities to impose street access charges by ordinance. 1 The
legislation would have restricted the use of generated funds to
arterial and collector street and highway capital improvement
projects. 17 In 1989, proposed land use legislation would have
allowed local governmental units to impose impact fees following the
adoption of a capital improvement program. 176 The impact fee
would have been required to be reasonably related to and expended
for the study, development, or improvement of existing and future
public facilities affected or impacted by an existing or proposed
development project. Yet another legislative attempt to give local
governments authority to impose impact fees was contained in the
170. See id. at 194.
171. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text for discussion of "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test.
172. Compare Sellergren, Development Exactions andFees - PublicNeed, PrivateRights,
Fairness, and the Law, 3 MINN. REAL EST. L.J. 162, 164 (1987) (terming it the rational
nexus test) with Knutson, The (Uncertain) Status of "ImpactFees" and Other Conditions
Imposed on Development 2 [Paper prepared for 1988 City Attorney Update
Conference] (1988) (on file with author) (terming it the reasonable relationship
test).
173. Sellergren, supra note 172, at 164. The relevant statute, MINN. STAT. §
462.358, subd. 2b, was modified in 1980 to include language developed in Collis. See
Act of April 15, 1980, ch. 566 § 27, 1980 Minn. Laws, 566 (amending MINN. STAT. §
462.358).
174. MINN. H.F. 1163, 75th Leg. (1987).
175. Id.
176. MINN.S.F. 1510, 76th Leg. (1989).
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1990 Transportation Bill.'
The language of that bill authorized
street access surcharges to be imposed and paid in a similar manner
to property taxes. Most recently, the 1994 Minnesota Legislature
tackled the question of whether to allow impact fees. Like the
others, it declined to do so.
VI. COUNTRYJOE. AN ISSUE UNDECIDED

In the context of unpredictable and expensive development
costs for local government, and facing a shortfall of revenues needed
to upgrade its road system, the city of Eagan, Minnesota, a statutory
city with a rapidly expanding population, developed a "road unit
connection charge" applicable to persons seeking building
permits. 178 The charge was patterned on Minnesota Statutes, section
444.075, subdivision 3, which authorizes charges to be imposed in
connection with waterworks systems, sewer systems, and storm sewer
systems. 179 In 1978, when the fee was first established, the "road unit
connection charge" for a new single-family residence was $75.00, an
amount recommended by the city's consulting engineers after a
study had determined the extent of the shortfall. 80 Funds collected
through these charges were used to expand and improve the road
system and were generally paid by developers without significant
complaint."" In 1994, however, by which time the charges had risen
to $410.00 for a single-family residence, several contractors
182
challenged the legality of the charge.
The district court granted summary judgment to the city and
decided that the charge was not an illegal tax.' s3 On appeal, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the legality of the City's
charge, concluded that the charge was a tax, and held that the ci7
lacked express or implied statutory authority to levy such a tax.

177. MINN. S.F. 598, 77th Leg. (1991).
178. CountryJoe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 682-83 (Minn. 1997).
179. See id. at 682; see also MINN. STAT. § 44.075, subd. 3 (1996).
180. CountryJoe, Inc., 560 N.W.2d at 683.
181. See CountryJoe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 548 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996).
182. See id. Certification as a class action was deferred until motions could be
decided. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. The court of appeals noted that on a purely legal issue it need not
give deference to the district court's decision. See id. Although the parties argued
the case on the assumption that the road unit connection charge was an impact fee,
the court of appeals noted "[o]ur analysis does not depend upon a conclusion that
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The city argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court had earlier
found that municipalities had implied power to do things such as
impose a moratorium on development18 5 and eliminate
nonconforming land uses.1 6 The court of appeals rejected these
analogies reasoning that because the legislature had clearly
expressed its intent to restrict city taxing authority, the court was "not
persuaded that the broad interpretation of general police power set
forth in... [the earlier cases] extends to confer a right to impose
unauthorized taxes."18 7 As a result, the appeals court reversed the
district court and remanded the case for further proceedings,
188
prompting the city's appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
On March 6, 1997, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals decision.' 9 After reviewing the Municipal Planning
Act190 and several other statutes relating to statutory cities, the
supreme court held that authority to impose a road unit connection
charge Scould
not be implied from the planning authority granted to
191
the city.
After acknowledging the positions of the city and the
contractors concerning the ^sources
of authority needed to uphold
192
the imposition of impact fees, the court concluded that the road
unit connection fee did meet the definition of an impact fee193
proposed by Blaesser and Kentopp
because it was not "in an
amount which is proportionate to
the need for the public facilities
195
generated by new development."

road connection charges are, in fact, impact fees, and we do not reach that
conclusion." CountiyJoe, Inc., 548 N.W.2d at 285 n.4.
185. See Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 308 Minn. 52, 65, 245 N.W.2d 819, 826
(1976) (upholding moratorium on development which was of limited duration and
was enacted in good faith without discrimination).
186. See Naegele Outdoor Adver. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 500,
162 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1968) (upholding the village council's decision to eliminate
all commercial uses, including billboards, from residential districts).
187. CountryJoe Inc., 548 N.W.2d at 284.
188. See id. at 287.
189. CountryJoe Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681,687 (Minn. 1997).
190. MINN. STAT. ch. 462 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
191. See Country Joe, 560 N.W.2d at 683-84.
192. See id. at 685. The city argued that impact fees could be upheld under the
implied power doctrine; the contractors insisted the power had to be expressly
conferred by the Legislature. See id.
193. See id. at 685-86; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text for a definition
of an impact fee.
194. See Blaesser and Kentopp, supra note 1.
195. Country Joe Inc., 560 N.W.2d at 685 (quoting Brian W. Blaesser & Christine
M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The "Second Generation," in 1991 ZONING AND PLANNING
HANDBOOK255, 264 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1991)).
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Instead, the Eagan charge was found to be a revenue raising
measure and not a regulatory fee permitted under the general
welfare powers conferred on statutory cities. 9 6 The court further
concluded that because the road unit connection charge was not an
impact fee, it "need not reach the issue of whether impact fees are
authorized in Minnesota in order to pass on the validity of the road
unit connection charge imposed by the city." 97 As the city had
disregarded its engineer's recommendations to update cost changes
and revenue projections, it could not show that the fees were
"proportionate to the need created by the development upon which
the burden of payment fell." 198
Rejecting the city's final argument, the court decided that
general revenue raising measures were not permitted under the
city's regulatory authority. 199 The court reserved to the future the
questions of whether impact fees are authorized by the Municipal
Planning Act, or can be authorized under home rule charters or the
statutes applicable to statutory cities."'
VII. EFFECT OF COLVTRYJOE ON MINNESOTA LAW-ISSUES TO BE
RESOLVED

Minnesota

has

neither

given

cities

express

legislative

authorization to enact impact fees, 20 1 as other states have,

nor

definitively answered whether implied authority to do so exists under
203
The question must then be asked: What effect did
current law.
CountryJoe actually have on Minnesota law?
In Country Joe, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that the
road unit connection charge established by the City of Eagan was not
To the contrary,
authorized under the implied power doctrine.
the fact that the legislature had expressly provided for sewer and
water connection charges and for road improvements by special

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 686.
Id at 685.
Id. at 685-86.
See id. at 686.
See id.

201.
202.
203.
204.

But see supra note 11.
See supranote 55.
See supranote 53.
See Country Joe, Inc., 560 N.W.2d at 684; see also supra note 191 and

accompanying text.
205. See MIN. STAT. § 444.075, subd. 3 (1996).
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assessment 2°6 "supports the opposite conclusion.
The court noted
that since the legislature had "specically provided a funding
mechanism
for
road
improvements
[through
special
assessments];.., no funding mechanism need be implied to
effectuate
the ,,208
legislative grant of authority to undertake road
•
improvements.
Consequendy, the court refused to "imply that
the legislature... intended to confer broad financing powers under
the [Municipal Planning Act]."'09 In sum, the City of Eagan was
attempting to exercise the powers of taxation and not those of
regulation.
The Country Joe analysis fails to address two critical issues: First,
whether the charge, if properly within the definition of an impact
fee, would be authorized under the Municipal Planning Act or
210
under the general welfare provisions applicable to statutory cities;
and second, whether a home rule charter city could use its charter to
confer upon itself the authority to impose either a road unit
connection charge similar to the charge imposed by the City of
Eagan, or a regulatory impact fee of the type described by Blaesser
and Kentopp.
The first issue focuses on the distinction between
taxing authority and regulatory authority. The second issue requires
an evaluation of the differences in the powers conferred by the
legislature on statutory cities and the powers that home rule charter
cities can confer upon themselves.
Distinguishing between general revenue raising through
taxation and recoupment of costs through the imposition of
regulatory fees is fundamental. Cities in Minnesota have no inherent
sovereign power to tax, but only such power as has been conferred
by the state constitution on the legislature. 2

206. See id. §§ 429.021, subd. 1(1); 412.221, subd. 6 (1996).
207. CountryJoe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681,684 (Minn. 1997).
208. Id. at 684 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. See id. (reserving "the issue of whether impact fees are authorized under
Minnesotalaw"); seealso MINN. STAT. ch. 462 (1996 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. §
412.221, subd. 32 (1996).
211. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
212. See Hyland v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 717, 719-20
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "[Miunicipalities have no inherent power of
taxation, but only that power granted by the Constitution or legislature."). Village of
Brooklyn Ctr. v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 335-36, 96 N.W.2d 585, 587 (1959) (finding
that "[i]t is well settled that municipalities have no inherent powers but have only
such powers as are expressly conferred by statute or are implied as necessary in aid
of those powers which are expressly conferred"); Costley v. Caromin House, Inc.,
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In CountryJoe, the court merely determined that the city had not
been delegated authority to impose a tax. Once the court had done
so, its decision was relatively easy. The power to regulate, however,
"includes the power to deny development that is contrary to the
public health, safety, or general welfare," and "includes the power to
condition development approval on compliance with standards or
contribution of land, improvements, or fees to mitigate otherwise
harmful 'impacts' on the community." "'
Notwithstanding the court's conclusion in CountryJoe, that there
appears to be no express power in state legislation to impose impact
fees in Minnesota, the question remains whether such authority
can be reasonably implied from the Municipal Planning Act,215 be
216
created by charter, or be found in the general welfare powers of
statutory cities set forth in section 412.221 of the Minnesota
statutes.
A.

MunicipalPlanningAct

Although the court in Country Joe concluded that "we need not
reach the issue of whether impact fees are authorized in Minnesota
in order to pass on the validity of the road unit connection
charge, "21 dicta by the court gives little reason for optimism that the
court expects to find this power in the Municipal Planning Act as
currently written. As the court stated, "[t]hat the Municipal
Planning Act expressly confers broad municipal planningpowers on
cities does not necessarily imply that the legislature similarly
intended to confer broad financing powers under the Act."219

313 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn. 1981) (holding that "[i]n Minnesota, however, a
municipality has no inherent power to enact zoning regulations. A municipality
receives power to zone only by legislative grant of authority by the state.").
213. Morgan, supra note 2, at 6; Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246
N.W.2d 19 (1976).
214. See supra Part V.C. (discussing lack of express statutory authority for impact
fees). But see MINN. STAT. § 462.358, subd. 2b. (1996) (authorizing a cash payment
in lieu of park dedication pursuant to a local subdivision regulation).
215. SeeMwN. STAT. § 462.351 (1996).
216. Id. § 410.01 (1996).
217. Id. § 412.221, subd. 6 (1996).
218. CountryJoe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. 1997).
219. Id. at 684 (determining the legislature failed to expressly provide for a road
charge) (emphasis added).
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CharterAuthority
CountryJoe involved a statutory city.220 Article 12, section 4 of the

Minnesota Constitution confers power on the Legislature to enact
legislation permitting local government units to adopt home rule
charters. 221 Minnesota statutes allow home rule charter cities to
provide "for the regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully as
the legislature might have done before home rule charters for cities
were authorized by constitutional amendment in 1896." 2 Thus, if
the capital facilities being funded through impact fees are a matter
of local or municipal concern, arguably a charter amendment could
be drafted to permit impact fees within the constraints of CountryJoe.
Country Joe clearly rejects the view that authority to impose
impact fees for Eagan's road unit connection charge can be implied
from the Municipal Planning Act. 223 What is not clear is whether this
conclusion refers only to Eagan's charge, which was determined to
be a tax, or whether the lack of implied delegated authority by the
legislature applies to any road unit connection charge, including
those imposed by a charter city. In either case, the fact that the
Minnesota Supreme Court "reserve [d] the issue of whether impact
fees are authorized under Minnesota law, 224 provides an opportunity
to attempt to resolve the issue through the adoption of an express
charter amendment.
C. PolicePower
Under current Minnesota law, a city cannot rely on broad
statutory authorizations conferring reglatory powers to justify the
use of a road unit connection charge.
This view is more typical
than not. 226

Nothing in Country Joe suggests that the Minnesota

220. See id. at 683 (noting that the City of Eagan is a municipal corporation that
has not adopted a home rule charter).
221. See MINN. CONSr. art. 12, § 4. Relevantly, the section provides "[a] ny local
government unit when authorized by law may adopt a home rule charter for its
government." Id.
222. MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (1996).
223. See Counhy Joe, Inc., 560 N.W.2d at 684 (finding where legislature has
specifically provided a funding mechanism for road improvements, no funding
mechanism may be implied from a city's municipal planning authority).
224. Id. at 686.
225. See id. at 686 (stating "[w]e have consistently rejected that the general
police power extends to permit revenue raising measures by municipalities." ).
226. Compare Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 890 P.2d
326, 328 (Idaho 1995); Douglas County Contractors Ass'n v. Douglas County, 929
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Supreme Court sees any reason to take up the minority position on
this subject.
VIII. METROPOLITAN GROWTH AND THE MUNICIPAL CHALLENGEOR, IMPACT FEES: WHO NEEDS 'EM?

General growth patterns make it clear that assistance for local
infrastructure development is essential. Growth in the seven-county
metropolitan area of Minnesota from 1970 to 1995 was dramatic.
During that twenty-five year period, the population of the area grew
by almost 575,000 persons, from 1,874,612 to 2,448,967;22s
employment rose by nearly 611,000 jobs, from 779,000 to
1,389,766;22 and households increased by about 371,000, from
230
573,634 to 945,027.
Projections suggest that growth from 1995 to
the 2020 will be equally dramatic. The population of the area is
expected to increase by more than 600,000 persons. 231 Households
will grow from 945,027 in 1995 to 1,265,000 in 2020, an increase of
almost 320,000, 232 while the number of jobs is expected to increase
by almost 400,000.233
These projections describe future growth in the seven-county
metropolitan area with implications as significant as those of the
growth of the previous twenty-five years.
Anticipating the
P.2d 253, 259 (Nev. 1996); Building Indus. Ass'n of Cleveland & Suburban County v.
City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ohio CL App. 1995); Hillis Homes, Inc. v.
Snohomish County, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (Wash. 1982).
227. See METROPOLrAN COUNCIL, REGIONAL BLUEPRINT (Dec. 1996). The sevencounty metropolitan area includes the counties of Anoka, Carver, Dakota,
Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott and Washington. See id. at 84. The Metropolitan Council,
a statutorily created regional development authority gathered data relating to
population, households and employment in the metropolitan area. This data was
gathered to forecast metropolitan growth and to create guidelines affecting regional
systems. "These forecasts reflect the Council's policies for increasing the density and
intensity of land uses in the urban area for redevelopment and reinvestment in the
urban core, and for the protection of prime agricultural land and environmentally
sensitive areas." Id. at 74.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Seeid.
231. See id. at 8. The Metropolitan Council's Preliminary Forecasts in March
1997 show the growth figure to be 618,163, from 2,448,967 in 1995 to 3,067,130 in
2020. The Metropolitan Council's publication, METRO 2040 (April 1997), uses the
figure 650,000. See id.
232. See id. (projecting as many as 330,000 more households in the metropolitan
area in the year 2040).
233. See id. at 74 (projecting job growth in the metropolitan area to increase
from 1,389,766 to 1,770,730).
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infrastructure demands that these figures imply, Metropolitan
Council planners recommend concentrating higher levels of growth
within the Metropolitan Urban Service Area (MUSA).'34
By
increasing housing density and encouraging job concentration
inside the Interstate 494/694 highway system, the Metropolitan
Council hopes to encourage the use of the current regional
infrastructure and thereby reduce costs that would otherwise arise if
the anticipated growth occurred outside the MUSA line.
The lynch pin between these regional policies and the
obligations of municipalities lies in the statutory requirement of
consistency between local comprehensive plans and metropolitan
Council regional system plans, and the requirement that local
ordinances conform to local comprehensive plans.

By December

31, 1998, all municipalities within the seven-county metropolitan
area are required to review their comprehensive plans to assure
consistency with local official controls relating to land use, and to
assure consistency of the comprehensive plans with the Metropolitan
Council's guidelines.2 3 6

Both the anticipated growth and the

regional policies of maximizing the use of present regional
infrastructure have significant repercussions for cities.
First, large increases in the number of people in the metro area,
whether inside or outside the MUSA, will require new services,
shopping malls, schools and other traffic generators that increase the
local government infrastructure needs. The facts in Kottschade v. City
3238

new local roadways are

to new development.

Similarly,

234. See id. at 27-28. The Metropolitan Urban Service Area, or MUSA, is the
built-up area with central sewer and water service. See id.
235.

See MiNN.

STAT.

§ 473.858 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (establishing that zoning

ordinances in conflict with the comprehensive municipal plan shall be brought into
conformity with the plan through review and "if necessary" amendment of the plan
by the local governmental units).
236. See MiNN. STAT. § 473.864 (Supp. 1998); see also MINN. STAT. § 473.854
(1996) (finding the council responsible for preparing and adopting guidelines
which will assist local government in assuring consistency).
237.

537 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).

238. In 1978, the City of Rochester and Olmsted County published a study
which determined the need for improvements in a portion of the local highway
system due to heavy traffic from an IBM plant and anticipated future
development. See id. at 303. Between 1978 and 1987 Franklin
P.
Kottschade
acquired nearly 24 acres adjoining the highway system in question and planned to
develop the site for a retail shopping mall, an office building, a grocery store,
a
Target store, and two restaurants. Id. Between 1980 and 1981 Kottschade
petitioned the local planning board for variances to allow him to convey a part of
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss3/1
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development of the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, not
only required state and interstate highways improvements, but also
huge local expenditures for roads feeding into those highways while
increased demand for sewer capacity added another several million
dollars in cost to the project. Without the power to make exactions,
and impose impact fees and linkage fees, the costs of new
development must inevitably be spread in part against the existing
tax base.
Second, commercial, industrial, and housing development
tends to depend largely on the state of a historically cyclical
economy. When borrowing costs are high, developers are reluctant
to make large investments in new development. In a metropolitan
area, this causes a pent-up demand for housing, office buildings, and
retail centers, which is thrust upon local governments when
borrowing costs drop.239
Third, the effort to control budget deficits at the national level
has trickled down to local governments and limited their ability to
raise revenues.
Whether accomplished by constitutional
amendments, as with Proposition 13 in California, or by legislation
as in Minnesota,2 41 these limitations lead to inadequate local physical
and financial resources to provide essential services and capital

his land to Dayton-Hudson Corporation for the opening of a Target store. Id. at
304. The board initially denied the requests because of right-of-way concerns with
the new highway system. Id. The plan was finally approved after Kottschade
submitted a request which did not include land designated as right-of-way on the
official city map. Id. In late 1985 and early 1986, the city completed plans for the
highway improvements and proceeded to acquire
the
right-of-way
from
Kottschade through condemnation proceedings. Id. On September 24, 1986 the
court-appointed condemnation commissioners awarded Kottschade
$938,740
($5.50 per square foot for the land and $.60 per square foot severance damages)
for the condemned property. Id. In May 1987, Kottschade petitioned the city to
vacate an unused street easement along the southern border of his property. Id.
The city offered to vacate the easement on condition that Kottschade pay $5.50
per square foot based on the figure determined in the condemnation proceeding.
Id. The city tabled formal action on the application pending determination of
the outcome of the parties' appeals concerning the condemnation proceeding.
Id. In November 1988, the city formally conditioned approval of Kottschade's
request for vacation of the easement on his payment to the city of $123,750. Id.
239. The unpredictability of development can be regulated to some extent by
growth management plans. In New York, a complex system linking the timing and
sequencing of development to capital improvements was upheld as falling within the
ambit of state enabling legislation. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo,
285 N.E.2d 291, 300 (N.Y. 1972).
240. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §1.
241. Act ofJune 2, 1997, ch. 231, art. 3, § 4, 1997 MINN. LAws 2471.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998

37

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 24

facilities. In short, development is often both unpredictable and
expensive for local governments.
IX.

A.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Purpose

In light of Country Joe, it seems likely that adoption of
appropriate legislation is the surest way to provide municipalities
with the ability to meet potentially overwhelming needs for public
infrastructure and services. Any such legislation should incorporate
at a minimum a well-defined purpose and clear guidelines as to how
it is to be applied in practice. Other provisions may be less essential,
but should still be considered as ways to make the legislation more
palatable to those who will be most directly affected by the
legislation.
Enabling legislation should make clear that the imposition of
fees is an express delegation of regulatory police power authority
and not a revenue raising measure. 242 Morgan 243 recommends
several regulatory objectives which can be included in express
provisions "such as attraction of economic development,
encouragement of low and moderate-income housing opportunities,
revitalization
of central city areas, and prevention of urban
2
spread." "
B. Reasonableness
Commentators have identified a number of factors that can be
used to evaluate the reasonableness of impact fees.245 These factors
focus on identification of the affected geographical location, the
need for new facilities and the benefits of these facilities to the new
development, preservation of the fees for the purposes identified,
and the amount of the fees. 246 Proposed legislation should address at

242. See, e.g, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-71-1 (Michie 1993) (determining that
legislative findings include the need to establish an "equitable program for planning
and financing public facilities" that includes the police powers necessary for
"protect[ing] the public health, safety, and general welfare .. .
243. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 6.
244. Id.
245. Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling
Legislation, 25 URB. LAw. 491, 491 (1993).

246.

See id. at 495.
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least these factors.
1.

Service or Benefit Areas

Presumably,

the

greater

the

physical

distance

between

improvements and the development they purportedly serve, the
harder it is to demonstrate a benefit to that development. At least

half of the states
enacting impact
fee247legislation have provided for
•
•
service or benefit area requirements.
Wisconsin simply defines a
service area as "a geographic area delineated by a political
subdivision within which there are public facilities."8
Illinois
requires that it be "designated by the unit of local government in the
comprehensive road improvement plan." 249 In Georgia, service areas
are "a geographic area defined by a municipality, county, or
intergovernmental agreement in which a defined set of public
facilities provides service to the development within the area," and
must "be designated on the basis of sound planning or engineering
principles or both." 25 However they may be defined, their purpose
is to limit the area to which the fees are applied.
2.

Needs and Benefits Provisions

The need for increased capital improvements or facilities as the
result of new development can be established through a needs
assessment. The assessment can be a separate study process or can
be made a part of the capital improvement plan for the new

development.

Of the states with express statutory authority for

impact fees, at least eighteen 251 require some form of capital
247.
§

SeeARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-1105(b) (West Supp. 1997-1998); GA. CODE
36-71-4(b) (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-143(a) (1996); IDAHO CODE §
67-8107 (Supp. 1997); 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-911 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 36-7-4-1300 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-1 (West Supp. 1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-1 (Michie 1993); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10502-A (West 1997);
TEx.Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 395.001 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1136-101 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, § 5201 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050
(Michie Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 720-3 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.55 (West Supp. 1997).
248. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.55(1) (g) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
249. 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-903 (West 1993).
250. GA. CODEANN. § 36-71-2(17) (1993).
251. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-1106 (West Supp. 1997-1998); GA. CODE ANN. §
36-71-2(16) (1993); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-141 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 67-8103
(Supp. 1997); 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-910 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-41318 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4354 (West 1996); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 674:21 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-5, 6 (West Supp. 1997); N.M.
ANN.
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improvement plan that identifies
capital improvements for which
5
1
impact fees may be used.1

The elements of capital improvement plans may vary, but their
general purpose is to outline the deficiencies in improvements and
facilities which exist because of the new development. Indiana's plan
requirements, called "zone improvement plan," is typical. As a
prerequisite to imposing impact fees a governmental unit must
prepare a zone improvement plan that includes:
(1) A description of the nature and location of
existing infrastructure in the impact zone.
(2) A determination of the current level of service.
(3) Establishment of a community level of service. A
unit may provide that the unit's current level of
service is the unit's community level of service in the
zone improvement plan.
(4) An estimate of the nature and location of
development that is expected to occur in the impact
zone during the following ten (10) year period.
(5) An estimate of the nature, location, and cost of
infrastructure that is necessary to provide the
community level of service for the development
described in subdivision (4). The plan must indicate
the
proposed
timing
and
sequencing
of
infrastructure installation.
(6) A general description of the sources and amounts
of money used to pay for infrastructure during the
previous five (5) years.

STAT. ANN. § 5-8-6 (Michie 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 391.235 (1996); 53 PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10504-A (West 1997); TFx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 395.014 (West
Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5201(2) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050
(Michie Supp. 1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.02.060 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 720-3(0) (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.55(1) (a) (West Supp. 1997).

252. For definitions of capital improvement plans, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §
67-8203(5) (Supp. 1997); TEx. Loc. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 395.001(2) (West Supp.
1998).
253. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-1318(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss3/1

40

1998]

Olson et al.: The Future of Impact Fees In Minnesota
THE FUTURE OF IMPACT FEES IN MINNESOTA

Texas, more elaborately, requires:
(1) a description of the existing capital improvements
within the service area and the costs to upgrade,
update,
improve, expand,
or replace
the
improvements to meet existing needs and usage and
stricter safety, efficiency,
environmental, or
regulatory standards, which shall be prepared by a
qualified professional engineer licensed to perform
the professional engineering services in this state;
(2) an analysis of the total capacity, the level of
current usage, and commitments for usage of
capacity of the existing capital improvements, which
shall be prepared by a qualified professional engineer
licensed to perform the professional engineering
services in this state;
(3) a description of all or the parts of the capital
improvements or facility expansions and their costs
necessitated by and attributable to new development
in the service area based on the approved land use
assumptions, which shall be prepared by a qualified
professional engineer licensed to perform the
professional engineering services in this state;
(4) a definitive table establishing the specific level or
quantity of use, consumption, generation, or
discharge of a service unit for each category of capital
improvements or facility expansions and an
equivalency or conversion table establishing the ratio
of a service unit to various types of land uses,
including residential, commercial, and industrial;
(5) the total number of projected service units
necessitated by and attributable to new development
within the service area based on the approved land
use assumptions and calculated in accordance with
generally accepted engineering or planning criteria;
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(6) the projected demand for capital improvements
or facility expansions required by new service units
projected over a reasonable period of time, not to
exceed 10 years.25
The analysis required by Subsection (a) (3) may be prepared on
a system wide basis within the service area for each major category of
capital improvement or facility expansion for the designated service
255
area.
Although these requirements may be more than is necessary to
meet constitutional standards, they all attempt to establish a proper
foundation for the calculation of the need for capital improvements
and facilities caused by new development. If the plan is properly
prepared, the supporting data should be sufficient to demonstrate
the burden caused by new development and establish that the
proposed new facilities are sufficient to satisfy the needs of the new
development.
3. PreservingFunds
The purpose of impact fees is not to raise funds for general
government revenues. Earmarking and dedicating impact fees
assures that the fees collected will be used only for the capital costs of
the improvements and facilities necessitated by the new
development; failure to do so can be catastrophic to a legislature's
intentions. 256 The Florida Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance
which authorized impact fees for connecting to water and sewer
systems "for failure to spell out necessary restrictions on the use of
fees it authorizes to be collected."2 57 At least eighteen states separate
254. TEx. Loc. Gov'T. CODEANN., § 395.014(a) (West Supp. 1997).
255. See id.
256. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 321
(Fla. 1976).
257. Id. The court noted that
[t]he failure to include necessary restrictions on the use of the
fund is bound to result in confusion, at best. City personnel
may come and go before the fund is exhausted, yet there is
nothing in writing to guide their use of these moneys, although
certain uses, even within the water and sewer systems, would
undercut the legal basis for the fund's existence.
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accounts by service areas, facility type or both so as to prevent
2518
commingling with general revenue funds.
4.

Amount of the Fee

The amount of the fee in relation to the cost of the needed
public improvements and facilities implicates proportionality tests.
Needs and benefits standards are obviously indispensable in assisting
planners and city officials in meeting these tests. Other provisions
have also been used to fine-tune the fee requirements to prevent
overcharging new developments. One common provision allows
contributions for off-site improvements, which may include park
dedications or in-lieu of fees to be adopted against the required
impact fee. Fees may also be reduced by funds used from non-local
sources to pay for improvements necessitated by the development,
such as state highway funds.
Refund provisions are also commonly employed to assure that if
the fees are not used to construct the projected improvements, the
fees will be repaid. 260 The Florida District Court of Appeal, while
holding that a no refund rule was not invalid per se, found that the
authority's application of a no-refund rule when the anticipated
development did not occur led "to a result which 'defies logic' and is
clearly unfair and inequitable."2

6

'

Fee reimbursement is not

normally automatic and one-year statutes of limitations are often
used, although it is not always clear whether the owner or the
developer is entitled to the refund. 262 Finally, states may establish in
258. SeeARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-1105(A) (3) (a) (West Supp. 1997-1998);
CAL. Gov. CODE § 66006 (West 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §22-54-102 et. seq.
(1998); GA. CODEANN. § 36-71-8 (1993); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-144(1)
(1996); IDAHO CODE § 67-8103 (Supp. 1997); 605 ILL. COmP. STAT. 5/5-913 (West
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-74-1329 (West 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Tit. 30-A,
§ 4354(2) (B) (West 1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 674:21 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-8-16 (Michie 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 391.235 (1996); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10505-A(d) (West 1997); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 395.024 (West Supp.
1998); VA. CODEANN. § 82.02.050 (Michie Supp. 1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
82.02.070 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 7-20-3(a) (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.55(8)
(West Supp. 1997).
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §
259. Many states include these provisions.
66.55(6) (d), (e) (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODEANN. § 36-7-4-1321(c) (West 1997).
260. See Cardillo v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth., 654 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla.
Dist. Ct.App. 1995).
261. Id. See also Nemeth v. Florida Dep't of Rev., 686 So. 2d 778, 779 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (holding that taxpayer had standing to bring action for a refund
under impact fee statute even though taxpayer failed to file application for refund).
262. The issue can be easily settled by specifying in the ordinance who may apply
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their impact fee legislation the length of time allowed between the
263
collection of the fees and their use in constructing improvements.
C. AdditionalProvisions
1. Advisory Committees
About one-third of statues expressly authorizing impact fees
provide for an advisory committee to make recommendations to the
local unit
of government before the adoption of an impact fee
S
264
ordinance.
These provisions generally require that forty percent
of the members of the committee be representatives of the real
estate, development, and building industries. Illinois also includes
labor representatives. 265
2.

Exemptionsfom Impact Fees

In order to respond to criticism that impact fees tend to drive
up housing costs, a number of states have excluded low and
moderate-income housing from payments of impact fees. 266 Indiana
267
allows for a reduction of fees for affordable housing developments. '
New Jersey has gone farther in support of its court-created
constitutional obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the
development of affordable housing 268 by upholding linkage fees
imposed on commercial and non-inclusionary residential
development for low-income housing.269 This authority would be
for the refund.
263. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-144(5)
Hawaii has a six year period).
264.

(Michie 1996) (stating that

SeeGA. CODEANN. § 36-71-5 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 67-8106 (Supp. 1997);

605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-907 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-1338 (West
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-8-37 (Michie 1993); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10504A(3) (West 1997); TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 395.058 (West Supp. 1998); VA.
CODE ANN. § 82.02.050 (Michie Supp. 1998).
265. See 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-907(4) (West 1993).
266. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.55(7) (West Supp. 1997).
267. See IND. CODEANN. § 36-7-4-1326(a) (West 1997).

268. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713, 728 (N.J. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel , 456 A.2d 390, 415 (N.J.
1983) (Mt. Laurel II).
269. See Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 288
(N.J. 1990). "It is fair and reasonable to impose such fee requirements on private
developers when they possess, enjoy, and consume land which constitutes the
primary resource for housing." Id.
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presumably sufficient to allow municipalities to waive impact fees for
lower cost housing if such fees are authorized or to require
reasonable fees for non-inclusionary subdivisions.
3.

Hearings

All statutes authorizing impact fees require at least one public
hearing before the local unit of government adopts the impact fee
270
271
7
ordinance.
Texas
and Illinois 27 are more extreme in their
public hearing requirements, which occur separately before
adopting land use assumptions, the capital improvements plan, and
the impact fee ordinance.
4.

The ConstitutionalStandards

The courts that have considered the standards applied to
exaction cases are clearly less than unanimous in their
understanding of Nollan and Dolan. However the courts may
interpret the standards, a legislature should carefully consider the
wisdom of including the language of constitutional standards in
enabling legislation, as a number of states have done.
On the one hand, the Illinois Supreme Court apparently
believed it was important to include the specifically and uniquely
attributable test in the enabling statute.
On the other hand,
7
Morgan, in State Impact Fee Legislation: Guidelinesfor Analysis, Partf

recommends against it, for good reason.
Although Morgan
acknowledges the trend to inclusion of constitutional standards, the
drafters of impact fee legislation often confuse the relationship
between statutory standards and constitutional analysis, and merely
promote litigation. 275 Any legislature considering the adoption of
legislation authorizing local governments to use impact fee
ordinances should recognize that the constitutional standards will be
applied whether or not the statute includes them, and should instead
devote its energies to drafting legislation that will simply meet these
270. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.55(3) (West Supp. 1997).
271. See TEX. Loc. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 395.055 (West Supp. 1997).
272. See 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-905 (West 1993).
273. See Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 649
N.E.2d 384, 389-90 (Ill. 1995). "[I]t appears clear that the first enabling act (which
the Court struck down) was not written with the... test in mind.... " Id. at 390.
The second statute did contain the language of the test and was upheld. See id.
274. See Morgan, supranote 2, at 3.
275. Id. at 7.
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CONCLUSION

In Minnesota, as in all states, new development leads to
increasing demands for additional streets, utilities, and other
public services. All of these improvements cost money. Taxpayers
are already frustrated with what is seen as the high cost of
maintaining existing public infrastructure.
The resulting
legislature- and voter-initiated limits on municipal budgets have
only increased the pressure on local governments to find new ways
to finance the infrastructure needed to serve new residential and
commercial development.
While not a perfect solution, impact fees place financial
responsibility for new public facilities at least in part on those who
create the need for them. Properly designed impact fees can be
one of the most equitable solutions to a problem that may at times
seem almost insurmountable to local government, a factor that
likely explains much of their increasing popularity.
Whether impact fees will ever be permitted in Minnesota is
another matter. The courts have left open the possibility that a
home rule charter city could lawfully adopt an impact fee
ordinance and, with a close enough eye to existing law, a statutory
city could perhaps do the same. The uncertainty surrounding the
matter, however, poses significant risks for any city that attempts to
do so. Furthermore, the policy implications surrounding impact
fees in particular, and infrastructure financing in general, demand
a full and public legislative debate.
The ultimate question is not whether someone will have to
pay the public costs of new development. The only question is who
will pay.
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